HYDAD-D (left) and PRIS (right) devices, with their operating crews. The string marking the test lane can be seen in both images. A minor
problem was reading HYDAD-D’s oscilloscope screen in strong sunlight.
All photos courtesy of John F. Crawford

Trial of Ground-penetrating Radar,
Neutron and Magnetometry
Methods in Arid Soil in Egypt
Metal detection and digging are somewhat unsatisfactory approaches to locating landmines. This report
presents and examines alternative detection solutions, such as ground-penetrating radar as well as neutron and
magnetometry methods. A case study of these techniques in a laboratory setting and in Egyptian soil reveals
their effectiveness.
by John F. Crawford

The Problem
Current methods of finding landmines, based largely on metal detection and careful digging, are not completely satisfactory. Various
other techniques are being used or under study—notably ground-penetrating-radar, neutron and magnetometry methods. As discussed below,
soil moisture has an adverse effect on the first two techniques.
Ground-penetrating radar. Unlike pulsed radar, continuous-wave
radars work by transmitting at a certain frequency (typically for a mil-
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lisecond) and then stepping to the next frequency. The reflected signal
is measured in amplitude and phase at each frequency and stored. After the specified frequencies (typically 256) have been scanned, a fast
Fourier transform is carried out on a laptop. This converts from frequency
information to time (i.e., space) information, which is displayed to the
operator on a laptop screen. GPRs detect discontinuities in the soil’s dielectric constant, such as a landmine. In nonmagnetic soil, radio frequency energy penetrates a distance set by the “skin depth”

APM

ATM

Type

Quantity

Charge weight

Total weight

Comments

VS-50
PMN

2

43 g

185 g

w/o 18 g metal plate

2

240 g

600 g

Box

2

ca 200 g

N/A

1 wood, 1 plastic

T-80

2

4.5 kg

N/A

plastic

TM-46

1

5.7 kg

8.6 kg

steel

Israel

1

10.5 kg

N/A

steel

M-71

1

6.25 kg

9.8 kg

steel

Mk-7

1

8.89 kg

13.6 kg

steel

Table 1: Available anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.
All tables courtesy of John F. Crawford/CISR

No.

Object

Depth (cm)

HYDAD-D

PRIS GPR

Depth (cm)

Remarks

0

DLM-2

0

1

Scrap

0

False Positive

False Positive

5-10

2

PMN

20

True Positive

True Positive

15

3

Empty

True Negative

True Negative

4

PMN

10

True Positive

True Positive

5

VS-50

20

True Positive

False Negative

6

Scrap

20

True Negative

False Positive

7

Empty

False Positive

True Negative

8

Empty

True Negative

False Positive

9

Empty

True Negative

True Negative

10

Scrap

10

True Negative

False Positive

15

11

Box

0

True Positive

True Positive

5-10

Wood

12

VS-50

10

True Negative

True Positive

15

See note 12

See note 0

20
See note 5
5-10
15

See note 8

Notes:
0. DLM-2 was a small dummy landmine supplied by the IAEA; it was visible, and was used for calibration only
5. See second bullet under Comments and Conclusions.
8. Although this position was nominally empty, three soft-drink ring-pulls were buried here
12. HYDAD-D was misbehaving during this measurement, the last of the trial; on its return to Cape Town it turned out to have a
fault that might have caused it to miss this mine.

Table 2: APM lane results. Column 3 shows the cover depth; Column 6 the depth estimated by PRIS.

where is the soil resistivity, λ is the RF wavelength and is the impedance of free space
(about 120π Ω). With increasing soil moisture, both and δ diminish, and the RF does
not penetrate the ground very well.
Neutron methods. Explosives contain
significant amounts of hydrogen; for example, TNT contains 2.2% hydrogen by weight,
or, more meaningfully, 24% by number.
Therefore explosives moderate neutrons effectively. This effect can be exploited for ex-

plosive detection as follows: Fast neutrons
from a suitable source, such as Californium or
Americium-Beryllium, are moderated by the
soil, and then detected by slow neutron counters (usually 3He proportional counters). An
excess of hydrogen, e.g., in a mine’s explosive,
will yield an enhanced count rate. However,
this effect depends on the soil not containing too much hydrogen, the presence of which
will prevent the neutrons from penetrating
and will moderate them, weakening and ob-

scuring the signal. Thus in soil containing the
same amount of hydrogen as the explosive,
e.g., as water, there will be no signal.
Magnetometry. Magnetometry is an established technique in archaeology. In addition to finding very small amounts of iron, a
magnetometer is sensitive to rust. Thus even
heavily corroded steel mines, such as those
commonly found in North Africa, should be
detectable.
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No.

Object

Depth (cm)

PRIS GPR

Depth (cm)

1

M-71

21

True Positive

15

2

T-80

21

True Positive

20

3

Empty

True Negative

4

Empty

True Negative

5

TM-46

35

True Positive

30

6

Mk-7

27

True Positive

20-25

7

Empty

True Negative

8

Empty

True Negative

9

Empty

True Negative

10

Israel

11

Empty

True Negative

12

Empty

True Negative

30

True Positive

25

Table 3: ATM lane results. Column 3 shows the cover depth; Column 5 the depth estimated by PRIS. Because of the size of these mines,
there were no false results and PRIS was able to estimate their depths fairly well. Time did not permit HYDAD-D to be tested on this lane.
Egypt as a Test Area
Both GPR and neutron methods should perform better where the soil
is dry, as is the case in North Africa for most of the year. Beyond that,
magnetometry should be effective against the steel-cased mines that are
common there. Given the successful tests of these techniques in the laboratory,1 a natural next step appeared to be to organize a combined test
in Egypt of as many devices as possible, especially GPR and neutron
methods. The idea was first discussed at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Technical Meeting on Combined Devices for Humanitarian
Demining and Explosives Detection in Padova, Italy, in November 2006,
where many of the laboratory tests were reported.
Three stepped-frequency continuous-wave GHz GPRs were available. A team from Raumfahrt Systemtechnik in Salem, Germany, brought
two such devices, both of which they had designed and built: the Handheld Operational Demining System (HOPE) and Potash Roof Inspection
System.2 HOPE works from 2 to 6 GHz and PRIS from 0.55 to 3.8 GHz.
Beyond that, the Egyptian National Research Institute of Astronomy
and Geophysics provided a Geophysical Survey Systems, Inc. MF20 GPR
working at 0.1 to 0.8 GHz and 1 to 2 GHz, and a fluxgate magnetometer.
Two neutron detectors were available: the Hydrogen Density Anomaly
Detector-D3 from the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and the
Egyptian Scanning Landmine Detector (ESCALAD),4 built by a collaboration of Dutch and Egyptian institutes.
Methodology
In a convenient part of the Inshas Centre of the Egyptian Atomic
Energy Authority, two test lanes were marked out in flat, dry, sandy soil
by means of strings stretched between pegs. Every 2 m, a position was
marked with a knot. At each position an object could be buried (either a
mine or scrap metal) or else nothing was buried there; selection among
these three options was done at random. Objects were covered to depths
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of 0, 10 or 20 cm, again at random. Surface objects were covered by just
enough soil to conceal them. The soil at empty positions was disturbed
enough to avoid providing a visual clue. The trials were “single blind” in
the sense that the testees were not told which objects were in which positions. Five anti-personnel mines and five anti-tank mines (see Table 1 on
previous page) were buried in the test lanes; two additional mines were
required for simultaneous tests with other equipment. The two photos
on the previous page show HYDAD-D and PRIS with their operators.
Test Lane Results
Table 2 (previous page), and 3 (above) show the results of the above
tests. Neither HYDAD-D nor PRIS detects landmines as such; rather
they detect proxies in the form of hydrogen anomalies and radar reflections, respectively. Accordingly, the statements “Positive” and “Negative” in the Tables refer to the apparent presence or absence of these
proxies. “True” and “False,” on the other hand, refer to the presence or
absence of a mine.
The following are remarks on the APM test lane results:
• The Dimension Laser Metrology-2 calibrator was 4 m away from
Position 1; the other positions were 2 m apart.
• HYDAD-D took about 30 minutes to measure each position on
the APM lane; this can be improved to only a few minutes.5
• PRIS took less than 60 minutes to measure all 12 positions in a
lane; these results are more fully described elsewhere.6
• The MF20 GPR made a scan of the whole lane in only a few minutes.
The following are remarks on the ATM test lane results:
• In a separate test, HYDAD-D saw such a strong signal from some
of these mines that the signal confused part of the software.
• In a separate test in a different area of the test field, PRIS missed one
of the T-80 mines, apparently because a cover plate was missing.

Extra Results
Although the trial concentrated on the
test lanes, some further useful results were
obtained:
• As an exercise, a PMN was buried
15 cm deep. The PRIS GPR was used to
scan the area in the manner of a metal
detector. The PMN was found with no
difficulty.
• A fluxgate magnetometer belonging to
the National Research Institute of Astronomy and Geophysics could detect
steel ATMs at several meters. A caesium magnetometer—some orders of
magnitude more sensitive—is on order.
Comments and Conclusions
A number of conclusions came out of this
testing, including the following:
• As expected, the dry Egyptian soil
made it easier to detect the mines.
• A VS-50, well-known as a difficult
mine for conventional metal detectors,
was seen at a depth of at least 20 cm
by HYDAD-D. Those involved in this
work believe this to be a record. Given
that the VS-50s provided were not fitted
with optional metal plates,7 this result
may be competitive with what conventional metal detectors would have been
able to do.
• Because Egyptian soil is dryer than
even a comparable sandy European
soil, PRIS was able to see about 0.7 m
into the ground—about twice as deep
as in Europe.
• The University of Cape Town’s HYDADD device and the RST GPRs were transported as normal airline luggage—not
even as excess baggage in the HYDADD case, because some standard electronic units that the device needed
were available in Cairo. However, a few
small obstacles were encountered. The
equipment brought in from Europe and
South Africa was held up overnight by
customs at Cairo Airport, because the
official on duty lacked the authority
to clear the equipment. On release the
next morning, the RST radars—HOPE
and PRIS—had to be unpacked, reassembled and switched on. HYDAD-D
had to be unpacked, reassembled, connected to equipment supplied in Cairo,
and switched on. After minor problems
were overcome, the equipment was assembled and worked more or less nominally. This indicates the equipment’s

state of development. HOPE and PRIS
worked as expected; their antennas
have since been redesigned, partly as a
result of this test.
• The weather during our test (4–8 November 2007) was excellent for our
purposes: sunny, not hot by local standards, with light winds.
• ESCALAD gave a great deal of trouble,
apparently due to interference from
a nearby radio transmitter, to dust in
electrical connectors, and to a mismatch between the strength of its neutron source and its minimum practicable speed. ESCALAD is the first device
of its kind, and this was its first field
trial after satisfactory laboratory tests.8
• In part because of this work, improvements have been made to the equipment.
A further test, also involving γ backscattering and Superconducting Quantum
Interference Device magnetometry is
planned for November 2010.
See Endnotes, Page 82
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